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Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-




Tort law has developed a number of creative doctrines to aid
plaintiffs who are unable, through no fault of their own, to identify the
causes in fact of their injuries.' Thus, when a defendant's negligent
conduct unites with another force to injure the plaintiff, the defendant
will be held liable if his or her conduct contributes materially and sub-
stantially to the injury.2 Liability is also imposed when the conduct of
multiple defendants is simultaneous but does not combine.' In Sum-
mers v. Tice,4 for example, the plaintiff suffered injury at the hands of
one of two hunters, both of whom fired negligently in his direction. To
aid the faultless plaintiff, the court shifted the burden of proof onto
each hunter to prove that he was not responsible for the plaintiffs sin-
gle injury.5 Similarly, patients who have suffered from the malpractice
t Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. J.D. 1974, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. I gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the many persons who read drafts
of this Article or who in conversation offered insights, criticism, or comments that helped deepen
my understanding of causation-in-fact rules and their possible modification in the novel contexts
discussed herein: Michael Alexander, Jan Almquist, member of the California Bar, Alan Brown-
stein, Professor of Law, UC Davis Law School; Jean Love, Professor of Law, UC Davis Law
School; Peter McAllen, Law Clerk, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; Wex Malone, Professor of
Law, Emeritus, LSU Law School; and Gary Schwartz, Professor of Law, UCLA Law School.
1. Cause-in-fact is defined and illustrated infra Part I, Section B. In general, the term refers
to the legal requirement that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs harm. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 237 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER, TORTS];
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 375 (1950) ("necessary antecedent
... something without which the event would not have occurred") [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
Proximate Cause]. See also J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 179-85 (5th ed. 1977).
While the following substantive developments in causation rules have taken place, procedural
innovations have occurred that have also eased the burden of the plaintiff who is initially unable
to identify the individual who has injured him or her. These include notice pleading, liberal rules
pertaining to amendment and joinder of parties, discovery, and "John Doe" complaints.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-433 (1965); iU § 876 (1979); W. PROSSER,
TORTS, supra note I, at 240-41.
3. This situation is sometimes referred to as "alternative liability," e.g., W. PROSSER,
TORTS, supra note 1, at 243-44. See also infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
4. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
5. Id at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
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of an unknown member of a medical team have been permitted to re-
cover from each member who could not demonstrate his or her own
freedom from fault.6
These doctrines have been widely followed and approved, and
seem unlikely to be abandoned. Indeed, the California Supreme
Court, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,7 recently extended the princi-
ple of Summers v. Tice to a suit against nine defendants. The plaintiff,
a cancer victim whose mother had ingested DES when pregnant with
her, was unable to present evidence linking her injury to a particular
drug manufacturer. She thus sued the major manufacturers of DES,
arguing that each should bear the burden of proving that it had not
produced the drugs the mother ingested. The court upheld her suit as
an extention of Summers and, when many of the manufacturers were
unable to absolve themselves, held each liable in proportion to its share
of the DES market.'
These developments aid plaintiffs confronted with uncertainty
over the defendant or defendant-class-plaintiffs who know they have
been injured, but not by whom. In Sindell, the plaintiff knew that she
had suffered injury as a result of the negligence of another and was
entitled to recover. What she did not know was which of nine drug
manufacturers was responsible. Suppose the places are reversed-that
Mrs. Sindell is one of nine (or some other number of) individuals, some
of whom have been injured by the negligence of a single defendant, but
who are unable to determine which among them has suffered injury at
the defendant's hands. Their inability might result from a long latency
period,9 or technological problems in separating out the contribution of
6. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 493-94, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944); D. LOUISELL & H.
WILIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 14.04-.05 (1977). Compare Ybarra with Hall v. E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enterprise-wide liability).
7. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The
court applied an "adaptation" or "modification" of the rule in Summers, in which each defend-
ant's responsibility for Sindell's injury was measured by its market share, id at 603, 610-11, 607
P.2d at 931, 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 144-45.
8. Id at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. See also concert of action
cases: Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, -, 289 N.W.2d 20, 26-27 (1979); Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. 244 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals, May 11, 1982); see also Henderson, Products Liability:
DES Litigation, The Tidal Wave Approaches Shore, 3 CoRP. L. REv. 143, 146-48 (1980); Birn-
baum, Products Liability, "Concert ofAction"Revisited" 2 Federal Courts Hold the Line, Nat. L.J.,
Oct. 12, 1981, at 37, coL I (DES cases reaching inconsistent results on similar facts).
In the DES cases, plaintiffs were able to establish both general causation (the tendency of
DES to cause certain rare types of cancer) and negligence in the marketing and labelling of the
product by the drug industry. Before Sindell, DES suits foundered on the requirement of specific
causation-the rule that plaintiff must prove that a particular defendant was the one whose acts
injured him or her. See generally Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Llablity,
46 FoRtDHAm L. REV. 963, 972 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Enter.prise Liablity] (unique
problem in the DES cases concerns crucial issue of cause-in-fact).
9. "Latency period" refers to the time interval required for a causal agent to take effect. See
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natural factors, such as aging, radiation, or genetic predisposition. 10
Nevertheless, they may know with scientific and legal certainty that de-
fendant's conduct has injured some of them." Should a "reverse-
Sindell" doctrine aid plaintiffs in the mirror image situation in which
uncertainty lies not in the defendant class, but in the plaintiff class?
This Article will explore the feasibility and desirability of ex-
tending tort theories to permit recovery in the reverse-Sindell situation.
The principal barrier facing "indeterminate plaintiffs" is the require-
ment of causation in fact-the rule that in a tort suit, the plaintiff must
show that defendant's conduct contributed to his or her injury. Al-
though the plaintiffs in Summers and Sindell could not prove causation
in fact, the court in each situation devised a rule that enabled the plain-
tiff to remain in court. Should a similar extension take place when the
uncertainty concerns not the origin or starting point of causation, but
its terminus?12
The extension, if it occurs, is likely to prove particularly useful in
cases of biological causation, in which an injury may develop years
after exposure, 3 or in suits for damage to property, such as pitted
windshields exposed to noxious chemicals, dust, or gravel. 4 But rather
than emphasizing particular forms of causation (cancer causation, for
example), this Article will examine two general paradigms of indeter-
minacy. The first Section describes the two paradigms and analyzes
generally Gelpe & Tarlock, The Use of Sclent0fc Information in Environmental.Decisionmaking, 48
S. CAL. L. Rav. 371, 404-05 (1974); tmdscale Accident: 24-year Perspective, 120 ScI. NEws 152
(Sept. 5, 1981) (fire in English plutonium plant in Oct., 1957 beginning to have measurable effects
on health of persons exposed). In Sindell, the latency period for DES was approximately 10-12
years. 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
10. See Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 9, at 404-05; sources cited infra note 13.
11. The various ways in which they might be able to establish this are discussed infra Part I,
Section A.
12. Thus, Thode's observation that "the plaintiffs starting point on the road to a tort recov-
eiy is to be able to pick the defendant out of the crowd; that is, to demonstrate factually that there
is a reason why this particular person is the defendant," Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proxi-
mate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV.
1, 2, is not strictly correct. The plaintiff's starting point in some cases is to recognize himself or
herself as a potential plaintiff--to pick himself or herself "out of the crowd."
13. In "biological causation," a force or substance affects the human body, with the injury or
disease manifesting itself months or years later. In some such cases the force or substance causes a
unique and easily recognizable form of injury, e.g., asbestosis. Such cases are not within the
contemplation of this Article. For further examples of biological causation, see sources cited infra
note 16 (Agent Orange, lead, Love Canal, radiation, cigarettes, DES, and asbestosis cases). For
discussions of causation-in-fact problems in cases stemming from various types of biological in-
jury, see generally Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 9, at 404-05; Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in
Technology,, 38 U. CN. L. REv. 587, 616-20 (1969); Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 8, at
974 n.36; Soble, A Proposalfor Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pol u-
tloxm'A ModelAct, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 706-09 (1976).
14. Eg. ,Winokur, Medfty Spraying Ruining Much Area Property: $10 Million Paid in Claims
So Far With 2,700 Pending, San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 20, 1981, § B, at I, col 5:
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them under current causation doctrine to determine the extent to which
existing law affords relief for indeterminate plaintiffs. Finding that
current law inadequately protects persons against victimization in situ-
ations when the defendant is identifiable but the plaintiff is not, this
Article next evaluates policy grounds for developing new doctrine. Af-
ter determining that public policy favors the development of new doc-
trine, this Article discusses alternative mechanisms by which courts
might afford relief. A final section identifies objections that could be
made to the development of rules designed to address problems of in-
determinacy in the plaintiff class, and offers answers to those
objections.
I
CAUSAL INDETERMINACY IN THE PLAINTIFF CLASS
The imagination can create endless fact patterns which include in-
determinate plaintiffs. For simplicity's sake, this Article focuses on two
patterns: cases of statistically proved causation, and cases in which
causation is mechanically proved. In both cases, modern tort rules
deny recovery because plaintiffs are unable to meet causation
requirements.
A. Two Paradigms
The first paradigm or example may be labelled "statistically
proved causation." Suppose that a person or corporation moves to a
region and begins to release a force or substance i" known to cause inju-
ries of a certain type. The injuries are not unique to the force or sub-
stance; they also occur naturally. Moreover, the injuries are causally
indistinguishable-experts cannot determine whether a case arises
from culpable human causes or nonculpable natural causes. 6 Further,
Despite an evident pattern of destruction that emerged.., when the spraying be-
gan, the chemical reaction pitting and staining car roofs .... fenders and plexiglass
windows ... remains a mystery.
Tests designed to finally identify the source of the problem currently are being con-
ducted by the state and several insurance and auto-paint companies.
See also Capps, $28 Million in Meafy Suits, San Francisco Examiner & Chron., Mar. 21, 1981, at
A-1, col. 2.
15. The force or substance could be: an adulterated foodstuff, radiation, environmental pol-
lution, or a biological agent. The paradigm is not limited to "environmentally" mediated injury,
although many such cases would fit within it. See examples cited infra note 16.
16. Many cases now brought, settled, or lost show aspects of Paradigm I-type indeterminacy.
See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) (circuit court affirmed
district court's certification of class including all Vietnam War veterans, their families and survi-
vors in action arising from exposure to chemical defoliant); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (asbestosis); Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prods., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th
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the culpable and nonculpable causes do not synergize each other: sub-
threshhold amounts of each do not combine to cause injury. 7 No
other human agent releases the force or substances.
Before the defendant's arrival, the region experienced a stable
("background") rate of 100 cases of the injury per year.' After the
defendant's arrival, the number of cases increases to 190 and remains
constant. Expert testimony establishes that the increased incidence of
the injury can only be attributed to the conduct of the defendant. 9 'In
Cir. 1975) (chemical wastes); Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961) (cigarette smoking as contributing cause of cancer); Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 485 F.
Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (radiation injury); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (DES); MacLeod, Family Says
PoisonAwardJs "Too Little and Too Late", San Francisco Examiner & Chron., Mar. 28, 1982, at
B-7, col. 1 (family won large settlement against chemical company for lead poisoning); Quigg, The
Nuclear Garbage Mess, San Francisco Examiner & Chron., This World (Magazine Section), Jan.
10, 1982, at 8, col. 1 (lawsuit brought against a radioactive waste disposal business). For commen-
taries discussing causation problems in such cases, see U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 131-40 (1967);
Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries from Radiation, 24 LA. L. REv. 1 (1963);
Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 9, at 404-05; Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liabiliy and Indemnity, 71
MICH. L. REv. 479 (1973); Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs: Say Latent Disease Suits Will Be Key
Battleground in '86s, 67 A.B.A.J. 139, 139-41 (1981) (discussing In re "Agent Orange" Prod Liab.
Litig.); Comment, Judicial Attitudes Toward Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 344, 370 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Judicial Attitudes]; Com-
ment, Toxic Substance Contaminatiorn The Risk-Benefit Approach to Causation, 14 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 53 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Toxic Substance Contamination]; Manhunt for Nu-
clear Test Survivors, 120 ScI. NEws 201 (1981) ("apparent" excess of cancers in soldiers forced to
participate in nuclear weapons tests conducted by U.S. government in 1945 and 1963; National
Veterans Law Center is encouraging the filing of claims with Veterans Administration). See gen-
erally Garmon, The Box Within a Box Within a Box, 120 ScI. NEws 396 (1981) (difficulty of
confining radioactive wastes safely).
17. Paradigm I cases thus do not fall within alternative liability, see supra notes 3-5; infra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text; nor within the group of cases treated under the "material
contributing factor" rule, see supra note 2; infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
18. As a corollary of this requirement, we also hypothesize that the region's population is
relatively stable, with little immigration or emigration.
19. In the example given, some variation in the annual background rate would be expected.
Too great an increase, however, would lead an epidemiologist to suspect that the change is not
attributable to chance but rather to some new factor. If that level is represented by 100+N, then
cases beyond this number are evidence of a new cause or agent. The level of confidence with
which the expert would make this assertion would depend on a number of variables, such as the
size of the population, the type of distribution, the stability of the population, and the magnitude
and suddenness of the variation. See generally B. McMAHON & T. PUGH, EPIDEMIOLOGY: PRIN-
CIPLES AND METHODS 29-46, 57-72, 157-73 (1970); J. MAUSNER & A. BAHN, EPIDEMIOLOGY 26-
40,91-109,307-35 (1974). See also infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (discussing objection
that proposal would founder on rules forbidding use of strictly probabilistic evidence).
It is sometimes said that "one can prove anything with statistics." The law has not adopted
such a hostile view. Suitably qualified statistical evidence has been admitted for a number of
purposes, see sources cited infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is patently
inaccurate; imagine, for example, trying to prove, with statistical evidence, that the increase in
cancer and birth defects in Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors was not caused by radiation from
the A-bombing of the cities, but rather is entirely explained by postwar changes in Japanese life-
style. The irradiation explanation simply dwarfs all other possible causal variables.
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such a case, injury to the class will be "statistically proved. 2 °
The second paradigm is that of "mechanically proved causation."
It requires simultaneously acting forces, one natural, the other human,
each causing a known number of undifferentiable injuries. 21  For ex-
ample, imagine that two hikers walk along the base of a rocky cliff. A
third person negligently throws a stone in their direction at the same
moment that a loose stone of the same description falls from the cliff.
Both hikers suffer identical injuries. The evidence establishes that the
thrown rock produced one injury, the falling rock the other, but it is
impossible to determine whose injury resulted from which cause.22 In
this example, the occurrence of a single culpable injury is "mechanical-
ly proved."
B. The Paradigms Under Current Causation Law
Even though it may be known with certainty (as in the second ex-
ample) or with an extremely high probability (as in the first) that the
defendant is responsible for injuries to one or more members of the
victimized class, causation rules make it unlikely that any of the victims
will recover.3 In general, the plaintiff must plead and prove causation-
in-fact.24 There are two tests in common use. The "but-for" test, under
20. Two questions immediately arise: Do cases like those in Paradigm I ever occur in the
real world? If so, why has tort law not yet taken account of them? Some such cases surely will
arise, see infra notes 18, 136-139 and accompanying text (discussing objection that such cases will
never occur). There would seem to be a number of reasons why tort doctrine has not developed
doctrines to deal with them. The first is simple technological lag. After all, it was not until 1980
that Sindell was decided, even though industry-wide drug injuries began appearing as early as
1960, McBride, Thalidomide and Congenital Abnormalities, 2 LANCET 1358 (1961) (letter to the
editor). Another is that it simply may not have occurred to plaintiff and counsel that they might
file suit when it could not be known with certainty that the plaintiff was culpably injured and was
entitled to receive compensation, see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
21. The force might include culpably caused electric shocks (occurring simultaneously with
a lightning discharge), mechanical impact (occurring simultaneously with a natural event, e.g., a
rock or earth slide), or flooding.
22. These facts are the inverse of those of Summers v. Tice. See supra note 4 and accompa-
nying text.
23. As in many articles of this type, there is a tension between arguing that existing law
effects relief and appealing for a new legal structure that will clearly do so. Compare infra notes
47-51, 58-62 and accompanying text (exploring elasticity in current law respecting causation) with
infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text (current approaches unsatisfactory because they overex-
tend the tort doctrines or permit duplicate recovery and "crushing liability"). See generally, War-
ren & Brandeis, The Right ofPrivacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890) (tracing transition from legal
protection of privacy-like interests to independent tort).
24. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 136, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) ("We begin with the proposition that. . . the
.imposition of liability depends upon a showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused
by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality under the defendant's control"); J. FLEMING,
supra note 1, at 176, 184; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 1, at 381. Causation-in-fact is the
requirement that plaintiff show that his or her injury would not have occurred without the defend-
ant's conduct. E.g., . FLEMING, supra note 1, at 180; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 1, at
[Vol. 70:881
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which the plaintiff must establish that without defendant's actions the
injury would not have occurred, is the most frequently employed test.2 5
A "material and contributing factor" test, which requires that plaintiff
only show that the defendant's conduct contributed to his or her injury,
is applied in some jurisdictions in cases of mixed causation.26
Our paradigms satisfy neither test. The "but-for" test is not met
because other factors, acting independently, may have produced the in-
jury. The "material and contributing factor" test is also unsatisfied be-
cause the factors operate separately and do not combine. Direct proof
of causation is therefore impossible.27 Circumstantial proof also fails
because no victim can make it appear more probable than not that his
or her injury stemmed from defendant's conduct. In Paradigm I, the
proportion of culpably to nonculpably caused injuries is less than half
(90 cases out of 190); in Paradigm II, the proportion is one-half.28 Un-
less causation rules are modified, defendants should win a series of
summary judgments.
A number of exceptions and special doctrines have been created to
mitigate the harshness of the "but-for" and "material factor" tests.
Many are designed to assist plaintiffs in situations, like ours, of multi-
ple causation. Although these special rules indicate a generalized flex-
ibility and willingness to accommodate new categories of plaintiffs
where justice demands, none seem capable of being applied to our par-
adigms. When the independent or concerted conduct of two human
actors harms a plaintiff, a number of doctrines, including that of Sum-
mers v. Tice, aid the plaintiff who is unable to trace causation to a
single defendant.2 9 But when one of two alternative causes is nonhu-
man, the plaintiff must prove causation by a preponderance of the evi-
dence; there will be no shifting of the burden of proof.
30
375-76. It is a rule of exclusion; if the injury would have occurred even if the defendant had
avoided acting as he or she did, then plaintiff cannot recover. Id at 377-78.
25. J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 180; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 1, at 377-78.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-433 (1965); J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 182-
84; W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 240-41.
27. This is so by hypothesis, see supra notes 15-16, 21-22 and accompanying text (causes
indistinguishable).
28. See Estep, Radiation Injuies and Statfstics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury
Litgatilon, 59 MIcH. L. Rnv. 259, 263, 270, 274 (1960) (legal effect of "doubling dose").
29. Independent actors: W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 243-44; see supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text (alternative liability). Concerted action: id at 294-98, 314 and cases cited
therein; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-433, 876 (1965).
30. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 224, 238-44, 284-85 and cases cited therein; Prosser,
Proximate Cause, supra note 1, at 275, 378, 381. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.
Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920) (innocent and culpable forces combined); Garcia v. Jo-
seph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 874-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846-47 (2d Dist. 1978) (plaintiff
was injured by one of two sabers, which had been commingled; held plaintiff could not use Sum-
mers . Yce to shift burden of proof onto defendants). See also J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 183,
188-89; Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall, 52 Ariz. 322, 328, 80 P.2d 952, 954 (1938); Morales v. House
1982]
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Theories of strict liability, negligence per se, or violation of statute
are similarly unhelpful, as all require proof of causation.31 Res ipsa
loquitur might seem promising, since it enables the plaintiff to benefit
from inferences that defendant was negligent and that the defendant's
conduct was the cause of plaintiff's injury.32 But res ipsa loquitur is not
available to individual plaintiffs in our paradigms because they cannot
show that their injury is of a type that does not occur without
negligence.33
A number of foreign and American courts have permitted plain-
tiffs to use statistical or epidemiological evidence to establish that their
injuries resulted from a given cause, such as exposure to a carcinogen.
3 4
But this form of proof cannot help the plaintiffs in the two situations
under discussion. Such evidence would be useless for the "mechanical-
ly proved" causation of the second paradigm. In the first paradigm,
statistics only enable a plaintiff to prove that the defendant is responsi-
ble for an increased number of victims. They do not help the plaintiff
prove that he or she is a victim. 35  Individual suits will fail, because
natural causes preponderate-are more causally efficacious than the
human causes-and there is no way to distinguish naturally-caused in-
juries from ones caused by human action. No plaintiff will thus be able
to prove that his or her injury was probably caused by the defendant.
It is tempting to think that joinder devices, such as class suits, may
offer relief. In each paradigm, a class is in a sense "injured"-known
to contain victims of defendant's action. But a class suit is no more
useful than a series of individual suits, at least until the doctrinal
Fire & Casualty Co., 342 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (La. Ct. App.), cert denied, 345 So. 2d 49 (La. 1977)
(defendant's contribution must appear more probable than not, in light of other factors that could
have caused the accident).
31. 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77,
83-85, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733-34 (3d Dist. 1978) (strict liability cases); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 20.1-.6, at 1108-16 (1956) & SuPP. at 92-104 (1968) (same); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286, at 25 (1965) (negligence per se); Rogers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 100 Ariz. 154, 162, 412 P.2d 272, 278 (1966). See generally Estep, supra note 28, at 273-80.
32. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 489, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944); W. PROSSER, TORTS,
supra note 1, § 39, at 214, 218-24. See McCoid, NegligenceActionsAgainst Multiple Defendants, 7
STAN. L. REv. 480, 482-501 (1955).
33. This is a prime requirement of a suit grounded in res ipsa loquitur. 25 Cal. 2d at 489,
154 P.2d at 689; W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, § 39, at 214; McCoid, supra note 32, at 485. In
our paradigms, the defendant will be able to point out a possible-indeed, probable-alternative
cause, namely a force of nature. For the same reasons, plaintiff will be unable to show that the
defendant was in exclusive control of the injury-producing instrumentality, another requirement
of res ipsa loquitur. Id
34. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 514-19 (8th Cir. 1975); cases cited supra
note 16 (DES, asbestosis, tobacco, radiation, chemicals); Podgers, supra note 16 (American cases);
Soble, supra note 13, at 707-12 (Japanese cases).
35. The expert only testifies that increased incidence of injury is caused by defendant's
conduct.
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problems of causation are resolved. In a class suit, the representative
must have a claim typical of the class. 36 Under current law, however,
the typical claim of a class member is a losing claim. Thus, a court
should dismiss the claim and decertify the class. A further requirement
is that the boundaries of the aggrieved class be ascertainable with rea-
sonable certainty.37 In our cases, this is impossible, since persons may
be injured by defendant without realizing it. A class suit is thus no
more promising than a series of individual suits. Permissive joinder
rules38 might allow plaintiffs to join forces at the pleading stage but
would not protect them against dismissal or summary judgment when
it became obvious that their individual claims were not maintainable.
A group of decisions known as "destruction of a chance" cases
3 9
comes closer to accommodating our paradigms, but also fails. In de-
struction of a chance cases, the plaintiff cannot trace the causation of
his or her injury to defendant, but is permitted to recover if he or she
can show that the defendant's action made a bad situation worse. A
patient, for example, may have a 25% chance for survival without an
operation and a 40% chance with a properly performed operation. If
the operation were not properly performed, some courts would uphold
causes of action in negligence for this deprivation, on the theory that it
is the loss of a chance, not the death, that is compensated.n
Although superficially similar, these decisions do not reach the
cases under consideration. In our first paradigm, each of the 190 mem-
bers of the injured class suffers injury because of one of two factors
causing harm. In this respect, the claim is similar to that of the surgical
patient, who is both sick and the victim of medical malpractice. But
unlike the surgical victim, the persons in our paradigm do not know
that human causes are responsible, even in part, for their injury; they
merely suspect it. As a whole, the class of 190 persons has suffered the
loss of a chance-the chance to have the usual complement of 100
members. But it would require major extension of notions of standing
and legal rights to permit classes to sue for such harms. Occam's Razor
suggests that conceptually simpler means be found if possible.41 As
36. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
37. Williams v. Page, 60 F.R.D. 29, 34-35 (N.D. IM. 1973); Eisman v. Pan Am. World Air-
lines, 336 F. Supp. 543, 547 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491-97
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. Eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder possible if parties-plaintiff assert "any right
to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative").
39. Eg., Kellenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aj'd, 37
N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975); C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF DAmAGEs 117-26 (1935).
40. See authorities cited supra note 39. See also Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th
Cir. 1966).
41. Attributed to William of Occam, this principle--that entities should not be multiplied
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will be seen, simpler means are indeed at hand.42
The only judicial statements that directly support plaintiffs in our
category are found in foreign cases which are no longer followed or
were never fully recognized. For example, an English court in a 1946
case, Vyner v. Wadenberg Bros. Ltd, held that the breach of a safety
provision would shift the burden of proving causation of a work-re-
lated injury onto the defendant employer. The case, however, was
overruled 10 years later by a unanimous House of Lords.44 Similarly, a
Canadian court in Cook v. Lewis, 45 a two-hunter case similar to Sum-
mers v. Tice, declared that a defendant who negligently "intermixed"
human causation with natural causation so as to destroy the plaintiffs
"power of proof' would bear the burden of disproof on the issue of
causation.46 The statement was dictum, however, as both causes in the
case were human agents.
In the United States, a number of statutes have been enacted to
address technologically induced injuries of the general type we are con-
sidering.47 Relatively few provide for compensation, however,48 and
all require proof of causation before the plaintiff is entitled to any rem-
edy.49 The Price-Anderson Act, for example, which imposes strict lia-
bility for radiation-based injuries, requires that a claimant demonstrate
that his or her injury resulted from the accident in question.' A few
statutes soften the requirement of proof by means of presumptions.5'
These occasional statutory innovations and foreign decisions are,
beyond necessity-urges that the simplest rule or theory be adopted consistent with the phenom-
ena or facts to be explained or organized. See, e.g., B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOS-
OPHY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FROM THE EARLIEST
Timss TO THE PRESENT DAY 472 (1945).
42. See infra Part III.
43. [1946] 1 K.B. 50 (Scott, LJ.).
44. Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw, 1956 A.C. 613 (unanimous decision by the House of
Lords).
45. [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1.
46. Id at 4.
47. See generally Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages and Compensation, 1979 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 347, 406-18 (summarizing statutes).
48. Id; see Comment, Toxic Substance Contamination, supra note 16, at 59; Vf. Soble, supra
note 13, at 703, 714, 723, 767-68 (current administrative and legislative mechanisms inadequate
for compensating victims of toxic substance pollution).
49. See, ag., 7 U.S.C. § 1444(a) (1976); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822-.824 (1977); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 403.726 (West Supp. 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1409 (1974); sources cited infra
notes 50-51; Vf Soble, supra note 13, at 705-09 (discussing difficulty of proving causation in envi-
ronmental injury cases). In a small number of statutes, the burden of proof with respect to causa-
tion is eased. See infra note 51 (use of presumption of causality in Black Lung Act).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976); Comment, The IrradiatedPlaint!. Tort Liability Outside Price-
Anderson, 6 ENVTL L. 858, 858-63 (1976) (discussing the Price-Anderson Act).
51. Eg., Black Lung Disease Act, 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (providing that a
miner who works for ten years in one or more coal mines and incurs black lung disease shall be
presumed to have contracted it as a result of his or her work in the mines).
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at best, straws in the wind. American case and statutory law has not
yet changed to accommodate injuries to classes the identity of whose
members is unknown. The main grounds for hope lie in the "excep-
tional" categories that have been carved out to aid particular classes of
victims confronted with uncertainty with respect to the defendant
class.5 2 These exceptions, responsive to considerations of policy and
fairness, 53 now accommodate cases of alternative and enterprise liabil-
ity, concerted action, "common goal," and certain categories of sheer
necessity.54 It would seem that if equally valid policy grounds exist on
behalf of indeterminate plaintiffs, a further extension is warranted. 5
The next section considers policy reasons that support such an
extension.
II
TORT POLICIES AND EXTENSION SINDELL TO
INDETERMINATE PLAINTIFFS
On its face a simple, mechanical formula requiring only a finding
of physical fact, the requirement of but-for causation is in reality a con-
textual, policy-sensitive instrument.5 6  This policy orientation is evi-
denced by the numerous exceptional categories,5 7 but it is also visible
in the way courts apply the doctrine in ordinary cases. Malone,5 s
Green,59 Keeton,60 and Prosser61 purport to find a sliding-scale ap-
proach, in which courts apply the causation-in-fact requirement with
decreasing stringency as the equities or public policies increasingly
favor recovery. Commentators of the law and economics school have
52. See supra notes 2-6, 29, 32, 34, 39-40 and accompanying text; Note, Proof of Causation in
Multparty Drug Litigation, 56 TEx. L. REv. 125, 127-31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Mul-
tparty Drug Litigation] (exceptions permitted in cases of concerted action, common goal, res ipsa
loquitur, and "necessity").
53. Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46
TEx. L. Rav. 423, 432 (1968); Note, Multiparty Drug Litigation, supra note 52, at 127-31; see
sources cited infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
54. See sources cited supra note 52.
55. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (causation-in-fact requirement applied with
policy considerations in mind). But see J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 179 (no social policy is strong
enough to warrant imposing liability where but-for causation is absent).
56. .g., Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 61-64 (1956) (cause less
a physical fact finding than a purposive, evaluative judgment); Pedrick, Causation, The "IWo
Done It"Issue, andArno Becht, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 645, 654, 657; sources cited infra notes 58-61.
57. See supra notes 2-6, 29, 32, 34, 39-40 and accompanying text; Note, Multiparty Drug
Litigation, supra note 52, at 127-29 (doctrines governing burden of proof on causation respond to
considerations of fairness, policy, access, and "necessity").
58. Malone, supra note 56.
59. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. Rnv. 543, 560-61
(1962).
60. R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF ToRTS at vii, 18-20 (1963).
61. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 459.
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found causation-in-fact of such slight value in promoting classic tort
goals that it might as well be replaced by general principles of eco-
nomic efficiency.6 2
Other writers, such as Gelpe and Tarlock, have argued that the
purposes of particular areas of the law, such as environmental protec-
tion, would be furthered by softening the requirement of causation-in-
fact or reducing the burden of proof below the standard of more prob-
able than not.63 Weinrib has asked why retention of the requirement as
an aspect of plaintiffs case is necessary, suggesting that in appropriate
cases, the requirement might be shifted onto the defendant. 64 The pol-
icy orientation that surrounds causation-in-fact makes it likely that a
court asked to extend Sindell-Summers reasoning to indeterminate
plaintiffs would evaluate the request at least partly in policy terms.
Such an examination would consider the extent to which relaxation of
causal rules would promote tort goals of compensation, loss spreading,
deterrence, economic efficiency, knowledge generation, and justice.65
A. Compensation
A central purpose of tort law is to compensate victims. Extending
Sindell-Summers doctrine to indeterminate plaintiffs would promote
this goal, although in a somewhat uneven or inexact manner. If all
members of the plaintiff class are permitted to recover fully, many will
receive possibly substantial awards even though the defendant did not
injure them. One solution is to provide only proportional recovery,66 in
which each member of the plaintiff class is compensated in proportion
to the damages sustained by the class as a whole. This method of dis-
tributing damages undercompensates some victims while overcompen-
sating others, a result some class members will see as unfair. The only
plausible alternative, however, is that provided under present rules-no
62. Calabresi, Concerning Cause andthe Law of Torts: An Essayfor Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 69, 79-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi, Concerning Cause]; Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-12 (2d ed. 1977); Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort
Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 432 (1979); Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rational.
ityin Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11 n.44 (1980).
63. Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 9, at 404-07. See J. KRiER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: READINGS, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON AIR POLLUTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS 218-
21 (1971); Katz, supra note 13, at 607. See generaly Pfennigstorf, supra note 47, at 360-65 (cost-
internalization by polluter a principal maxim in environmental law in U.S. and Western Europe).
64. Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REV. 518, 523-29 (1975).
65. These are the principal goals of the system of tort liability, W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra
note 1, at 16-24; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, §§ 26.1, 26.5, at 1361-64, 1370-74 (1956);
Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 62, at 79-87; Katz, supra note 13, at 607; Pound, The End
of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 233 (1944).
66. See infra Part III, Section B ("The Proposed Solution").
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recovery at all. 67
Relaxation of the burden of proof with respect to causation68
would be more attractive to plaintiffs, of course. A similar modification
has occurred in selected areas, such as Title VII litigation. 69 But the
hope for such an extension to environmental suits seems unrealistic.
Suits for damages in both paradigms, though meritorious, are not sup-
ported by the powerful historical and ideological policies against racial
discrimination. Moreover, they would be resisted by defendants on the
ground that they would impose "crushing liability" far beyond the
damage actually caused by their actions.
The modification proposed permits recovery corresponding to the
damage actually done, and thereby achieves a form of rough-hewn jus-
tice. All the persons who suffered injury after exposure to the agent
recover something, though less than what they would recover by estab-
lishing that causation was probable. No one recovers who does not
suffer an injury of the kind caused by defendant's conduct, and who
was not placed at risk by the defendant's acts.7 ° The extension thus
promotes the goal of compensating victims, although the promotion is
less than perfect.
B. Loss Spreading, Deterrence, and Economic Efficiency
From the viewpoint of the plaintiff who seeks complete compensa-
tion, the proposed scheme of proportional recovery operates imper-
fectly. From the defendant's perspective, however, the fit of certain
policies is perfect. Loss spreading71 is advanced without the inexact-
ness found in connection with compensation. The plaintiff class passes
the exact amount of accident costs on to the defendant, who can then
pass this amount on to the public through additional charges or insur-
ance. At the same time, the increased costs deter the defendant from
engaging in the liability generating practice. The in terrorem effect is
tailored to the deed; there is neither over- nor under-deterrence. Un-
67. See supra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Gelpe and Tarlock propose to lower the
quantum of proof for establishing cause-in-fact in environmental cases.
69. In Title VII litigation, the plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination need only establish
"disparate impact." The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the challenged
practice was not discriminatory. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971);
Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects ofEmployee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact
Analysis Under Title VII, 56 Tax. L. REv. 1, 5 (1977).
70. See description of Paradigms I and II supra text accompanying notes 18-21 (plaintiff
must be in zone of risk and must suffer an injury of the type caused by defendant's acts).
71. Loss spreading is a recognized policy of tort law. See supra note 65 and accompanying
text; Posner, Strict iabliy: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 205 (1973); Posner,A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
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like its effect on compensation, the extension of the Sindell-Summers
rule strongly promotes the tort goals of loss spreading and deterrence.
For the same reasons, the extension of Sindell-Summers reasoning
to the case of indeterminate plaintiffs advances the goal of economic
efficiency.72 Tortfeasors will face potential liability corresponding to
the damages they cause the public. Where injuries are avoidable at
lower cost by taking safety precautions, tortfeasors will have an incen-
tive to do so. A new rule permitting liability in the two paradigms thus
encourages businesses and individuals to act to maximize economic
wealth and social welfare.73
C. Knowledge and Justice
The extension of Sindell and Summers to cases of indeterminate
plaintiffs should also have a beneficial knowledge generating effect.74
At present, inability to trace causation aids defendants, who conse-
quently lack incentive to carry out research into injury causation. Im-
posing liability on defendants encourages them to investigate the
manner in which their actions endanger others so that they may escape
liability by showing that they are not to blame. It is possible to argue
that plaintiffs have an equal stake in avoiding injury and that the cost
of developing knowledge about mechanical or biological causation
should be placed on them. Ordinarily, however, the defendant-dissem-
inator will have greater access to the information and technology neces-
sary to develop this knowledge, and will be in a position to do so more
cheaply than members of the public. The burden is thus appropriately
72. For discussions of economic efficiency as a prime goal of tort law, see, e.g., G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 62; Coase, supra note 62; R. POSNER, supra note 62; Developments in the Law-
ClassActions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1356 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ClassActions].
73. The long latency period for some cases of biological causation falling under Paradigm I
might pose problems for the deterrence and economic efficiency rationales. If a manufacturer
disseminates a harmful agent at time X, and the judicial sanction is imposed for the first time only
many years later, the result may eem anomalous. How can deterrence and taking safety precau-
tions be furthered by a delayed penalty that the defendant could not have anticipated under rules
in effect at time X?
The harshness of the delayed penalty is mitigated somewhat by the requirement that the
actor's conduct, at the time of acting, be known to cause an increase in the rate of injury. See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Tortfeasors will be left with the argument that commis-
sion of a known injurious act, not prohibited under then current rules, should be forever immune
to tort sanction. This argument seems weak. It would also mean the defeat of all tort cases of first
impression, as tort rules could only be adopted prospectively. Plaintiffs would have little incentive
to press law reform suits.
74. Knowledge generation is a key goal of regulatory systems when dealing with technolo-
gies that, with further development, may be made safer or more humane. Eg., Soble, supra note
13; Delgado, Active Rationalit, in Judicial Review, 64 MINN. L. Rv. 467 (1980). See Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 160 P.2d
436, 440-44 (1944).
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placed on him or her.7"
Once it is seen that extension of Sindell's cause-in-fact treatment to
indeterminate plaintiffs serves goals of compensation, deterrence, eco-
nomic efficiency, and knowledge generation, the conclusion seems ines-
capable that such an extension is morally just.7 6 Existing causation
rules allow a blameworthy party to escape liability. The proposed
modification imposes liability and compensates victims in proportion
to the likelihood that they were, individually, injured by the defendant.
Faced with a choice between manifest injustice and inexact justice, the
law should prefer the latter.77
75. Cf C. McCoRMIvc, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 787 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972);
Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959)
(burden of proof often placed on the party with the best access to knowledge).
76. Tort rules ought to serve the cause of justice. E.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra
note 62, at 79; W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 3-4, 15-19.
77. This result, intuitively obvious, is fortified by analogy to three situations in which intui-
tion or case law support recovery:
I. Conspiracy. Persons who perform wrongful acts in concert with others are punished
in both tort and criminal law, in part because society does not want them to escape
liability merely because of diffusion of responsibility. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1,
at 294-98; W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 453-527 (1972). The
same insight applies to the case of indeterminate plaintiffs. A wrongdoer who diffuses
his or her wrongful act among a group of victims behaves just as reprehensibly as one
who joins with others in a criminal venture. One person who harms a group should not
escape liability when a group who harms a single victim does not.
2. Spatial comparison. The above reasoning is illustrated by a spatial metaphor. Imag-
ine a Paradigm Il situation in which a small group of miscreants negligently throws
stones in the direction of a single victim, who is injured when struck by a single stone.
Witnesses observe the incident, but are unable to tell which stone struck the victim be-
cause ofa barrier-a hedge, a row of trees-located near the stone-throwers. Summers v.
27ce applies, and the plaintiff can recover against each thrower without proof of specific
causation.
Contrast this situation with one in which a single person throws a stone in the direc-
tion of a group of persons who are exposed to the same type of injury from a natural
source. A barrier again obscures the paths of the stones; the evidence establishes that the
thrown stone injured one victim, but not his or her identity. Intuitively, the slight altera-
tion of the facts in this second situation does not alter the claim for relief. Each thrower
is equally blameworthy; each victim has an equally strong claim for recovery.
3. Single-victim/many act analogy. Imagine that a single defendant negligently exposes
a single plaintiffto repeated risks of injury. The plaintiff is also at risk for the same type
of injury from natural causes. The natural causes are more causally efficacious than
defendant's acts, so that the probability of a given injury's being attributable to the de-
fendant's conduct is less than 50 percent, say 40 percent. The causes act separately.
Over a period of time, the plaintiff suffers several injuries of the type in question.
If the plaintiff were to sue on suffering the first injury, he or she should lose; it would
be more likely than not that the injury was caused by natural forces. But if the plaintiff
sues after incurring two (or n) injuries, seeking recovery for only one injury, then he or
she presumably should recover. The probability that the defendant has caused at least
one injury now exceeds 40 percent. (Assuming that natural and human factors operate
independently, the chance that the defendant has not injured the plaintiff is now .60 X
.60, or .36. See generally C. McCoaiicK, supra note 75, at 492-93 (illustrating the
probability calculation involved)).
It seems reasonable to extend this result to the case of the class whose members are
endangered by similar conduct. The "vertical" experience of the individual, over time,
duplicates the "horizontal" experience of the class. That the harm is incurred by several
persons, rather than one, should not affect the case for liability. It might be argued that
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III
THEORIES AND MECHANISMS OF RELIEF
If tort policies and parallel reasoning support extension of the
Sindell-Summers result to situations in which uncertainty lies in the
plaintiff class, how might such a reform be effected? Two approaches
seem possible. In the first, existing tort mechanisms are manipulated to
accomplish the desired result. In the second, a new mechanism is cre-
ated. Although both approaches have merit, this Article urges courts to
adopt a new mechanism.
-4. Modfication or Extension of Existing Mechanisms
Courts may accommodate suits brought by plaintiffs in indetermi-
nate classes by modifying or extending existing mechanisms. They
could, for example, find that exposure to certain forms of risk is a harm
in itself, thus avoiding causal problems entirely.7" Thus, when the
plaintiff knows of the exposure and suffers fear and anxiety, recovery
could be permitted for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.7 9 Second, courts could shift the burden of proof to the defend-
defamation law does not afford recovery for defamation of a large group, and that physi-
cal harms should be treated no differently. But this argument fails. No recovery is af-
forded for defamation of a large group, because the members are not considered to have
incurred significant damage, W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note I, at 749-51. The same
cannot be said here.
78. By this, it is meant that a causal relationship between the defendant's act and plaintiff's
harm (redefined as exposure) would be found. Other causation problems might remain, for exam-
ple those concerned with proving the extent of consequential damages-lost income, medical ex-
penses, and the like. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 593 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (element of risk-without proof of actual harm-adequate to sustain injunction in envi-
ronmental suit); Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 9, at 412; Comment, JudiclalAtitudes, supra note
16, at 376 (proposing that carcinogenic exposure be regarded as a harm in itself).
In a different context, redefinition of harm was used in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laborato-
ries, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2d Dist. 1980), where a California appellate court
for the first time characterized being born with genetic anomalies as a legally compensable harm
in a suit brought by the child. In Curlender, a genetic testing laboratory was sued for failure to
diagnose Tay-Sachs disease, with the result that a child was born with the disease. Had the test
been performed properly, the child-plaintiff would not have been born at all, would not have filed
suit, and would not have had a basis (the hypothetical nonexistence) for calculating damages, All
earlier courts had refused to permit suit in similar "wrongful life" situations. The California court
upheld the cause of action, reasoning that existence-plus-abnormality is a cognizable harm even if
the alternative is nonexistence.
79. See W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, § 12, at 49-62 (infliction of mental distress). Re-
covery is generally permitted for conduct that exceeds the bounds of reasonable behavior, that is
calculated to cause serious mental distress, and that does in fact do so. Id at 56. The conduct that
is punished may be intentional, or "reckless in its deliberate disregard of. . . risks." Id. at 60.
Merely negligent infliction of distress without a physical impact or physical manifestation is gen-
erally not compensable. Id at 59.
Some of the cases in our paradigms could be accommodated under theories of intentionally
or recklessly created emotional distress. See, for instance, the more than 100 cases filed in Sacra-
mento, California, Superior Court in the period 1979-80 against an anesthesiologist who allegedly
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ant once risk-creation plus harm is shown, as was done in a leading
English case. More drastically, they could "estop" the defendant
from denying causation once his or her negligent conduct and material-
ization of the harm are shown.81
Courts could also lower the burden of proof where the defendant's
action appears especially reprehensible, so as to allow plaintiffs to re-
cover by showing that causation is possible, or conceivable, rather than
probable.8 2 They could hold plaintiffs "vicariously compensable," by
committed sexual acts on unconscious female patients during surgery. Some of the complaints
allege that the plaintiff was a patient in the hospital, may have been victimized by the anesthesiol-
ogist, had been unable to find out whether victimization occurred, and suffered psychological
distress as a result. Telephone interview with Mr. Vernon A. Leeper, Program Manager, Enforce-
ment Division, California Board of Medical Quality Assurance, Sacramento, California (Mar. 3,
1980); L.A. Times, June 4, 1980, Part I at 2, col. 5. See also Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 83
F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (certified a class of DES exposees; case will test whether exposure plus
fear of cancer-causation is compensable under theory like that under discussion); Ferrara v. Gal-
lucio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958) (mental anguish for X-
ray bums that could become cancerous held compensable). But see Mink v. University of Chi-
cago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716 n.2, 719 (N.D. I. 1978) (fear and anguish of DES-exposed mothers
over possible harm to their children held not compensable).
80. McGhee v. National Coal Bd., [1972] 3 All E.R. 1009 (H.L.), noted in Weinrib, supra
note 70, at 523-29. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 B comments f, g, h (1965)
(explaining Summers v. Tice-type alternative liability on the ground that it is defendants' conduct
that causes plaintifrs inability to identify the cause of injury); sources cited infra note 91; J. KRIER,
supra note 63, at 218-21; J. SAY, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 136-57 (1971) (burden-shifting reverses our historic preference for resource exploitation
by requiring those who modify natural ecosystems to explain and defend their actions); Gelpe &
Tarlock, supra note 9, at 374-88.
81. Where defendant breaches a statutory provision or a plain common law duty and where
"the injury... is precisely the sort of thing that proper care.. . would be intended to prevent
[the court will] allow a certain liberality to the jury in drawing its conclusion." W. PROSSER,
TORTS, supra note 1, at 243 n.53 (citing cases achieving this result by means of "estopper').
82. E.g., Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 9; Comment, Toxic Substance Contamination, supra
note 16 (proposing reduction in stringency with which factual causation requirement is applied in
environmental and public-health cases). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 243 n.53;
supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (commentators purport to find sliding-scale approach in
courts' treatment of causation-in-fact).
Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516, 526, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (1919), illustrates this
approach. The plaintiff, a resident of the city of Rochester, contracted typhoid after the city negli-
gently allowed the water supply to become contaminated. The plaintiff could not trace her own
sickness to the contaminated water, however, since there are many causes of typhoid other than
contaminated water. Plaintiff could not eliminate these other possibilities. After the water supply
became contaminated, the city experienced about a one-sixth increase in the number of typhoid
cases over the previous period, about 50 additional cases. The court held that where two or more
causes are possible, one culpable, the others not, the plaintiff need only prove defendant's respon-
sibility for her injury "with reasonable certainty." The court found such reasonable certainty in
the facts of plaintiffs case and reversed a nonsuit for the defendant. But see Wolf v. Kaufmann,
27 A.D. 281, 282-83, 237 N.Y.S. 550, 551-52 (1920) (plaintiff fell down an unlighted stairway;
there were no eyewitnesses or other evidence of the cause of the fall; held, action dismissed, as no
evidence was presented to eliminate other possible causes of the accident or to make the defend-
ant's negligence in not maintaining a light a more likely explanation of the accident than other
competing explanations). The result in Stubbs is open to the criticism that it overcompensates
plaintiffs, five-sixths of whom deserve no recovery, and overpunishes the defendant. See infra
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analogy to the concepts of transferred intent or vicarious liability,8 3
thereby permitting recovery on a showing that causation exists with re-
spect to some member of the plaintiff class. If through jury nullifica-
tion," a jury finds the defendant liable in one of our paradigm cases
and awards punitive damages, the court might condition the award on
plaintiff's willingness to share it with other similarly situated victims,
85
or might use it to benefit the injured class.
86
Finally, all or most of the claims of the indeterminately bounded
class might be assigned to a given individual or proxy, who would sue
for the known number of claims in return for a promise to distribute
any recovery.87 Subrogation could create the same result. Consider,
for example, a large health insurance carrier forced to pay the medical
expenses of all 190 victims in our first paradigm. The carrier can argue
that it is entitled to sue and to be compensated for the 90 additional
note 90 and accompanying text (without proration of the type proposed in this Article, simple
relaxation of the burden of proof with respect to causation can result in "crushing liability").
83. In transferred intent, A, intending to injure B, instead hurts C. A is liable to C for an
intentional tort. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 32. In vicarious liability, the liability of an
individual, B, who bears a certain relation to A (such as master-servant) is imputed to A for policy
reasons. Id at 458-67.
There seems to exist no theoretical reason why such legal fictions, already used to extend
concepts of deterrence and cost-spreading, could not be used in connection with compensation. If
vicarious action and transferred intent can be used to hold particular defendants liable once cer-
tain facts are shown, it would seem that other factual showings might render plaintiffs compensa-
ble, if equally pressing policy grounds urge it.
In either of these established sitautios, something about the relationship among the plaintiff,
the defendants, and the act is "realigned" to achieve the goal of holding A liable. Symmetry, as
well as a possibly desirable social result, may be achieved by a similar realignment in our para-
digms. The element of injiuy, tortiously caused by the defendant and known to exist somewhere
in the plaintiff class, is aligned to coincide with the class representative who prosecutes the suit.
This representative, at the outset of the case, satisfies every element of a negligence action except
provable loss, see supra note 15-22 and accompanying text. The imputed element completes the
picture.
84. Jury nullification occurs when a jury defies a judge's instructions and returns a verdict
against the law, usually to soften the effect of what the members regard as unfair legal doctrine.
See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMEmcAN JuRY 310-12, 433-35 (1966).
85. In one view of their function in tort law, punitive damages are awarded to plaintiff as a
stand-in for other persons who were also victimized by the defendant but who are unlikely to
bring suit. Rodgers, supra note 62, at 11 n.43 (discussing allocation of punitive damages in the
MER products liability cases).
86. The award could be used, for example, to establish a clinic or hospital for the treatment
of injuries of the type created, or for medical or scientific research aimed at preventing or curing
the condition. See infta note 97.
87. In Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224-25 (6th
Cir. 1980), a federal circuit court affirmed a finding by a trial court applying an "exposure" theory
to apportion liability among a number of insurance companies for asbestos related injuries. The
result held the insurers liable for a pro rata share of the injuries during the relevant exposure
period, corresponding to the period of time the insurance was in force.
The theory of recovery discussed in the text would apply similar logic one further step. An
insurer, like one of those in IN.4, would argue that it should be permitted to sue to recover the
medical claims for which it was held responsible, in a subrogation action against the tortfeasor.
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cases, even without specific identification of the victims."s
All these approaches are promising, and could be adapted by a
court to provide a method of recovery for indeterminate plaintiffs.8 9
Some have the drawback that they stretch existing doctrine to a possi-
bly undesirable extent. Others permit overcompensation and "crushing
liability" 90 against the defendant which exceeds the amount of dam-
ages actually caused.
B. The Proposed Solution
The best solution would combine the elements of the second and
final approaches described above. When a defendant has caused a
known number of injuries to a class, as in one of the paradigm situa-
tions, the burden of proof should be reversed, and the defendant should
be required to prove noncausation with respect to each injury.91 The
"prima facie case" that plaintiff must satisfy to obtain the described
relaxation of causal rules consists of the following elements: (i) that
88. The number of claims for which recovery would be sought is 90-N, supra note 19. See
16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61.111, at 300-01 (1966) (subrogation permitted
where insurer has paid claim that would be legally valid if sued on by the insured). Although
there appear to be no reported cases, it would seem that an insurer could sue for claims that it
could prove were paid, despite its inability to identify the policyholders who received payment for
the tortiously created injury.
89. See supra note 23 (existing tort mechanisms not fully adequate, but suggesting that pro-
posed solution is feasible).
90. See Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 463,481 (1980) (policy of causation rules is to avoid "crushing liability" for defend-
ants and to induce them to take greater care). In our paradigms, crushing liability could occur if
the plaintiffs' burden of proof is lowered with respect to causation, see supra text accompanying
notes 68-69, but he or she is permitted to recover full damages.
91. Burdens of proof, including those governing causation, commonly are allocated accord-
ing to notions of policy, necessity, and ease of proof. See, ag., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d
756, 772-73, 478 P.2d 465, 475-76, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 765-66 (1970) (burden shifted where defend-
ant's negligence resulted in lack of a witness by whose testimony plaintiff might have proved her
case); J. FLEMrNG, supra note 1 at 188-89; C. McCoRMcICK, supra note 75, at 785-87; Prosser,
Proximate Cause, supra note 1, at 386; RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2)-(3) & com-
ments a, c, f (1965) (burden of proof follows policy); Cleary, supra note 75; Note, Multiparty Drug
Litigation, supra note 64, at 127-31.
Suppose the rise in incidence of the injury is from 100 to 250 cases, an increase that, accord-
ing to expert statisticians and epidemiologists, cannot be accounted for by chance. If expert testi-
mony establishes that the incidence has more than doubled, then each plaintiff will prefer to sue
individually, as causation can now be made to appear more probable than not. The defendant's
potential liability is 250 cases.
Could a defendant take the initiative and sue for a declaratory judgment that it is only liable
for 150 injuries, thus compelling proration among the 250 possible claimants? Fairness to defend-
ants would suggest that this possibility should be preserved. Many defendants will hesitate to
invoke it, of course, for fear of flushing out claims that might not be brought. But see In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 587, 596 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (defendant corporation succeeded in compelling formation of a class consisting of all per-
sons who had claims for punitive damages against it arising out of the use of defendant's allegedly
defective birth control device).
CALIFORMIA LA.4W EVIEW [Vol. 70:881
plaintiffs have suffered an injury; (ii) that the injury be one that could
have resulted from either natural or human causes, acting separately
and without synergy; (ii) that the injuries be causally indeterminate-
that is, not identifiable as humanly or naturally caused; (iv) that the
defendant is the only possible human cause; and (v) that the population
injured, mode of risk, and other variables be uniform and stable
enough to permit calculation of the increased number of victims.
Once the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to prove noncausation with respect to each
injury. If he or she fails to do so, liability will be imposed for the
number of unproved victims. The defendant will be able to shoulder
this burden of proof in one of two ways. First, he or she can show the
plaintiffs calculation of the number of humanly caused cases is exag-
gerated.92 This would reduce his or her liability in proportion to the
reduction in number of victims. Second, he or she can show that there
is another human defendant who has injured some of the victims.
93
In return for relaxation of the causation requirement, a plaintiff
will be required to share any recovery with the other members of the
class.94 The named plaintiff would thus prosecute a representative suit,
and would be bound by the rules normally afplied in such cases, in-
cluding a fiduciary relationship to the class members.95 The plaintiff
92. That is, he could show that the figure is smaller than 190-N. See supra note 19 (calcula-
tion of number of victims).
93. If he or she is successful at showing the existence of two or more defendants, then neither
paradigm applies, and plaintifs suit should be dismissed, unless the plaintiff can: (i) identify the
class members victimized by the other defendant and drop them from the suit; (ii) show that both
human defendants are liable under existing law pertaining to concurrent tortfeasors, see supra
notes 2-6 and accompanying text; W. PROSSER, TORTS supra note 1, at 291-98; or (iii) convince the
court to combine the reverse-Sindell with the Sindell theory, so as to allow the suit to proceed as
an action by an indeterminate plaintiff class against an indeterminate defendant class, infra Part
IV, Section D. The latter alternative poses grave management difficulties, of course. Id
94. In current law, proration of liability among defendants is carried out pragmatically. If
there exists any reasonable basis for assigning particular damages to particular defendants, this
will be done. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 313-14; see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding insurers liable for pro-rata
share of damages in asbestosis suit).
It would seem that proration among plaintiffs in our paradigms is just as defensible as it is in
the classic tort contexts in which it is done in connection with defendants. See generally W. PRos-
sER, TORTS, supra note 1, at 317-23 (apportionment). Cf. Atomic Energy Damages Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2012, 2210 (1976) (providing for proration of claims of victihls of atomic accident if amount of
claims exceeds $500 million plus available private insurance coverage); MER Cases, Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1967),& Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 711-16, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 414-17 (1st Dist. 1967) (allocating right to
recover punitive damages in cases of injury to many persons). Methods by which a damage award
will be calculated and distributed are discussed infra note 96.
95. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval before class action set-
tied); id 23(c)(2) (requiring notice to class members in certain types of class suits). While a class
action (or other multiple plaintiff) action would not be required to be brought in cases falling
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class, if successful, would recover an amount corresponding to its com-
bined losses attributed to defendant's actions. This amount would be
allocated among the members pro rata, after subtracting litigation
costs. 96  Even if damages vary greatly from one class member to an-
other, or cannot be known precisely, established methods exist for en-
suring just compensation to each class member.97
From the defendant's perspective, the result corresponds exactly to
the harm created and cannot reasonably be viewed as unfair.98 From
the perspective of the plaintiff, the scheme compensates all who suffer
the injury and who were within the zone of risk.99 Society as a whole
under our paradigms, any plaintiff bringing an individual suit would suffer early dismissal or
summary judgment. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
The use of the class action vehicle is thus integral to the substantive remedy proposed here.
For the view that this interplay between substantive policy-effectuation and procedural channels is
an inevitable and desirable aspect of class actions, see Class Actions, supra note 72, at 1353:
Class action procedures assist courts in giving full realization to substantive policies in
two ways. First. . . they open courts to claims not ordinarily litigated. . . . Second
.. . they enable courts to see the full implication of recognizing rights or remedies
[thereby] judging precisely what outcomes of litigation would best serve the policies un-
derlying causes of action. . . . Through class action procedures, moreover, the interests
of absentees. . . are more likely to be given their due.
These considerations seem especially true here.
Must the plaintiffjoin all the class members in his or her suit? Sindell only required that the
defendant-class contain a "substantial" share of the manufacturers of DES. This would seem
sufficient here as well.
96. Thus, in the first paradigm, if each member of the exposed class suffered a loss of one
thousand dollars, and the evidence shows that the defendant is responsible for 90-N such losses,
see supra note 19, the class as a whole will recover (90-N) x $1,000. Each member will receive 1/
190 of this amount, minus the costs of the suit.
97. A number of solutions seem possible including:
(I) class-wide estimation of the total damages, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,
260-63 (5th Cir. 1974);
(2) sampling or averaging to arrive at an approximate damage figure, Petteway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d at 263 n.154; Shapiro, Processing the Con-
sumer Claim, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 257, 270-73 (1972);
(3) distributions to the class as a whole (by setting up a clinic or other treatment facil-
ity, for example), eg, Carlisle v. Eisen & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), acated and remanded on other grounds,
417 U.S. 156 (1974); Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963) (established fund for benefit of transit riders
after proof that PUC overcharged customers). See generally Class Actions, supra
note 72, at 1524-36 (discussing situations in which fluid recovery is, or is not,
appropriate).
Suppose that the injuries attributable to defendant and those attributable to natural causes are
undifferentiable but defendant believes, nevertheless, that he or she can demonstrate a bias toward
"cheap" injuries in the group of victims injured by his or her action. He or she should be permit-
ted to attempt to prove such a bias, and if a skewing is proved, the damage award should be
adjusted accordingly.
98. Class Actions, supra note 72, at 1356 (class action device forces defendants to confront
the full cost of their acts, thereby promoting social efficiency).
99. See supra notes 66-70 (compensation interest); Class Actions, supra note 72, at 1337
(overarching policy of law, achieving relief as congruent as possible with the class injured, facili-
tated by class actions, as contemplated herein).
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benefits because of the deterrent effect of the tort sanction, and because
defendants are no longer permitted to expose others to injury with im-
punity merely because causation is difficult or impossible to trace.
Tortfeasors, particularly corporate ones, will have an incentive to carry
out research that will permit them to carry the burden of disproof on
the issue of causation, thus avoiding liability. Once the specific mecha-
nism of causation is known, it may be possible to reduce the risk or
even eliminate it entirely.
IV
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
The conclusion that there ought to be compensation for indetermi-
nate plaintiffs and the method by which it is reached are mirror images
to those in Sindell. In both cases, modification of causation rules
avoids technological impossibility of proof, while the practical difficul-
ties of calculating liability or distributing relief are circumvented by
proration. Similar policy grounds support both extensions.
Because the two reforms stand on similar footings, this section
omits any discussion of criticisms that can be levelled at both Sindell
and the proposed companion remedy. For example, no attention is
given to the objections that both "open the floodgates" of liability, 1°°
violate due process, 10 1 or unduly burden entrepeneurial activity. 102
Nor is there discussion of the objection that both problems are best left
to an administrative remedy or a scheme of social insurance. 10 3 These
aspects of Sindell have already spurred a lively body of commentary;
some of them were discussed in the opinion itself. Sindell seems likely
to survive them. For the sake of economy, I assume the viability of
100. E.g., Podgers, su~pra note 16.
101. Eg., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603 n.17, 607 P.2d 924, 931 n.17, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 139 n.17 (1980) (discussing and dismissing due process objection).
102. Podgers, supra note 16; Shavell, supra note 90 (avoidance of "crushing liability").
103. Some (but not all) cases falling within the first paradigm might seem amenable to legisla-
tion or administrative treatment. See, eg., Green, supra note 16, at 505-06; Soble, .'upra note 13;
Comment, Manufacturers' Liabilty Based on a Market Share Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
.ies, 16 TULSA LJ. 286, 303-05 (1980); Comment, Toxic Substance Contamination, supra note 16.
Radiation, air pollution, food and water contamination cases, and cases arising from improperly
marketed drugs or foodstuffs might present the technical complexity that makes agency, rather
than court, treatment attractive. Sindell itself illustrates a problem (an unsafe medicine) falling, as
an initial matter, within the jurisdiction of an existing agency. Still, agencies rarely have the
power to award damages, see Posner,.4 Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 48-49 (1972)
(tort sanction more effective than administrative regulation); often become "captives" of the in-
dustries they regulate; and are currently viewed disfavorably as examples of intrusive, centralized
government. See also Peck, The Role ofthe Courts andLeg"slatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
MINN. L. REv. 265, 297-98 (1963) (arguing that case-by-case tort law approach can provide a type
of test-tube experimentation, results of which may eventually be incorporated in the form of
legislation).
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Sindell and the proposed modification in the face of all common
objections.
A number of objections do affect the argument for modified causa-
tion rules for plaintiffs uniquely, however, or at any rate more force-
fully than when applied to Sindell alone, and therefore merit separate
consideration. These objections include: (i) that the remedy imposes
liability on defendants who are non-negligent vis-a-vis plaintiffs, i.e.,
because of risk-creation simpliciter; (ii) that the remedy contravenes
doctrine and policy forbidding liability based on probabilistic evidence;
(ii) that the fact situations (Paradigms I and I) that call for application
of a reverse-Sindell rule are unlikely to be found in the real world; and
(iv) that Sindell and our remedy could be combined, resulting in liabil-
ity of multiple defendants toward multiple plaintiffs, and virtually end-
less liability.
4. Compensation for Plaintiffs not Demonstrably Injured by
Defendant's Actions
It is a basic principle of tort law that the plaintiff must show that
the defendant injured him or her." The Anglo-American system does
not award damages simply because a defendant has done something
reprehensible, created a risk, or behaved irresponsibly.10 5 It could be
argued that an award of damages to indeterminate plaintiffs would vio-
late this principle by compensating individuals who cannot show that
they have been injured by the defendant, or, indeed, by any human
being at all. In Sindell, the court permitted the plaintiff to recover
against drug manufacturers, many of whom did not injure her, because
of overriding policy grounds favoring recovery." 6
But overlooking causal indeterminacy for plaintiffs may seem a
more radical departure than permitting recovery for known plaintiffs
against indeterminate defendants, because an indeterminate plaintiff
may well have no reason to deserve recompense. Sindell deserved
compensation; her problem was that she did not know who had injured
her, and thus did not know from whom she was entitled to recover.
This may appear a less serious problem than that confronting indeter-
minate plaintiffs, who cannot prove that they belong in court--that
104. E.g., W. PRoSSER, TORTs, supra note 1, at 236-41.
105. Id at 18, 236-41; see sources cited supra notes 1, 24-26 (defining cause-in-fact
requirement).
106. The principal reasons were that: (1) as between an innocent plaintiff and a group of
negligent defendants, the burden of proof with respect to causation should be placed on the latter,
(2) tort rules should be flexibly adapted to enable them to deal with problems of modem technol-
ogy; and (3) the defendants were better able than plaintiff to bear or distribute costs. 26 Cal. 3d at
610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
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they have a cause of action at all.10 7
A number of responses seem possible. First, the defendants in
each of our paradigms unquestionably injured members of the plaintiff
class; plaintiffs cannot use the proposed remedy unless they first estab-
lish this. Defendants are thus not penalized for risk creation alone, as
they have demonstrably injured a number of victims. Further, the
plaintiffs' inability to trace causation and thus identify which of their
number were injured by the defendant is a result of defendant's action,
rather than any failure on the part of plaintiffs to investigate and de-
velop their case. Every plaintiff will be highly motivated to trace cau-
sation and thus recover a full, rather than a partial, share of the
damages. 108 Reverse-Sindell suits will be filed only when a conven-
tional suit is not feasible.
Finally, the proposed remedy gives only partial relief to members
of the indeterminate plaintiff class. The amount of each plaintiff's re-
covery is measured by the proportion of culpably injured to
nonculpably injured members of the class. If a class contains only a
small proportion of culpably injured victims, each member will recover
only a small amount. If the class contains a high proportion, each
member will receive an award approximating his or her actual dam-
ages. Any unfairness or "windfall" effect is mitigated by this pro rata
scheme of distributing damages. 0 9 Classes that contain a high propor-
tion of "deserving" plaintiffs will be in a position to provide each mem-
ber with nearly full compensation. Classes composed of a high
proportion of "undeserving" plaintiffs will recover only a small
amount.
B. Probabilistic Evidence
A second objection to a reverse-Sindell rule is that it awards dam-
ages on the basis of probabilistic evidence.Y0 Of course, only one of
the paradigms under consideration presupposes the use of probabilistic
evidence. In the second paradigm, the plaintiff proves causation
mechanically; probability theory plays no part.
The first paradigm does entail the use of statistical evidence, but
107. Thus seen, they are simply intermeddlers stirring up litigation in which they have no
standing.
108. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (members of indeterminate plaintiff classes
recover only partial damages).
109. Cf. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 145-46 (California Supreme
Court's discussion of the related question of when causal indeterminacy lies in the defendant
class).
110. Certain forms of completely probabilistic proof have been disapproved. See C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 75, at 493-98; Kaye, Probabiity Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L.
Rav. 1456, 1474-83 (1979).
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only to establish the number of culpably injured members of the plain-
tiff class. The comparison of before and after frequencies that the
model entails thus presents few of the dangers that courts fear in con-
nection with probabilistic evidence and that have on occasion led them
to exclude it. Probabilities are not used to single out the defendant 11'
nor to establish a causal link between conduct of a certain type and a
particular injury." 2 There is little risk that judge and jury will be para-
lyzed by obscure arguments or calculations."i 3  Unlike identification
cases, there is little danger that the jury will apply a probability coeffi-
cient to the wrong population or variable, 114 or that plaintiffs will delib-
erately use statistics to conceal a weak case."15 The danger of
dependent variables masquerading as independent is minimal."1
6
Thus, the arguments against the use of probability evidence do not ap-
ply to the paradigms under discussion.
C A Model Without Application?
A further objection that might be made to new causation rules for
I 11. Statistics are used at the outset to show that an increase in the number of victims is
greater than that which is likely to result from chance. Other possible causes are then eliminated,
resulting in the conclusion that defendant's action-independently known to be negligent-has
caused 190-N victims. See supra note 19. This use of evidence is thus unlikely to result in fasten-
ing blame on a completely innocent person; it is not used to pick the defendant "out of a crowd."
Cf. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 325-26, 438 P.2d 33, 36-37, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500-01 (1968),
in which a prosecutor attempted to prove that a couple charged with the crime was the same
couple observed at the scene of the offense by computing the combined probability that a ran-
domly chosen couple would have the following characteristics: partly yellow automobile, man
with mustache, girl with ponytail, girl with blond hair, Negro man with beard, interracial couple
in car. The case is discussed in C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 75, at 493-97. See also Tribe, Trialby
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1349-50 (1971)
(probabilistic evidence for identification purposes often rejected because of potential unfairness
toward defendants who are unlucky enough to bear certain characteristics).
112. Compare Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294-96 (3d Cir. 1961)
(plaintiff attempted to show that (i) cigarette smoking tends to cause lung cancer, (ii) he suffered
lung cancer, (iii) he smoked cigarettes; (iv) therefore, the cigarettes were probably the cause of his
disease) with cases falling under Paradigm I. In Paradigm I, the plaintiff is not attempting to show
such a connection between general conduct of the type engaged in by defendant and his or her
injury. Rather, the plaintiff is only attempting to show a connection between defendant's action
and an increased incidence of injury of a type known to result from conduct like that of the
defendant. The latter type of inference can be much more secure than the former because of the
much larger number of persons in the plaintiff class. An increase in the frequency of an event
from 100 to 190, see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text, may support a more confident
inference of causation than an increase from zero to one.
113. Cf. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 327-28, 438 "P.2d 33, 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 502
(1968); Tribe, supra note 11, at 1336, 1361-66 ("dwarfing the soft variable").
114. Cf. 68 Cal. 2d at 329-31, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04; Tribe, supra note Ill,
at 1364-66.
115. Cf. Kaye, supra note 110, at 1481-82.
116. Cf. 68 Cal. 2d at 328-29, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503; Tribe, supra note Ill, at
1366-68.
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indeterminate plaintiffs is that there would be few, if any, applications
for them." 7 If so, their proposal would be little more than an exercise
in symmetrical reasoning. It is probably true that the number of Para-
digm II cases that are likely to arise is not large. When an injury is
mechanically caused, it will often be possible for the plaintiff to elimi-
nate natural causation and make a case for human liability. Mechani-
cal forces generally operate quickly and without a latency period or
complex physiological mediating mechanisms to obscure cause and ef-
fect. In these cases, we properly expect the plaintiff to make his or her
case under conventional rules.118 Indeed, most plaintiffs will prefer to
do so in order to obtain full, rather than proportional, relief." 9
Some Paradigm II cases do seem likely to arise; witness the recent
"Medfly" spraying cases. 120 Moreover, even if Paradigm II cases arise
only rarely their infrequency is not a good reason for courts to refuse
them careful consideration when appropriate examples come before
them. Summers v. Tice, the defendant-side analog of Paradigm II, was
an "unusual" case when it was decided, as was Sindell. This was no
reason for denying the Summers and Sindell plaintiffs relief.
Paradigm I cases 12 are likely to arise somewhat more often. The
principal difficulties will arise from the requirements that there be only
one possible human cause, and that the population, mode of risk, and
other variables be stable enough to permit a statistical calculation of
the increased number of injuries above a background level. Such a suit
will be impossible if, for example, the population is shifting or highly
mobile, or if the background rate of the disease or injury varies greatly.
A Paradigm I suit will also be barred if there is not one but a multitude
of potential human defendants, as might be the case in a region that
117. The next subsection considers the objection that the proposal would have too many ap-
plications--that a reverse-Sindell doctrine could be combined with Sindell rules, resulting in end-
less liability.
118. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (use of reverse-Sindell principle requires
that plaintiff be unable to determine whether his or her injury resulted from natural or human
causation).
119. Where proof of causation is possible, the plaintiff can recover fully. In the model pro-
posed, only proportional relief is possible, see supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (Medfly spraying cases may exemplify Para-
digm II). Paradigm II requires simultaneously acting forces, one human, the other natural, each
causing a known number of undifferentiable injuries, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text. This paradigm of "mechanically proved causation" would apply if the number of pitted
windshields and paint jobs before and after Medfly spraying were known with great accuracy.
121. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text ("Statistically Proved Causation"). This
paradigm requires a number of injuries of a type that can result either from natural or human
causes, acting without synergy: that the injuries be causally indeterminate, .e., not assignable to
one category or the other by observation or investigation; that the defendant be the only possible
human cause; and that the population, mode of risk, and other variables be stable enough to
permit an epidemiological or statistical calculation of the increased number of injuries above a
background level.
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contains several polluters. 122
The requirements of Paradigm I would be most easily satisfied in
connection with immobile or "captive" populations, such as members
of a workforce, inmates of a mental or penal institution, students at a
school, or residents of small, isolated communities. 23 Uniformity of
exposure could be met if it appeared that each individual suffered a
common risk, for example from airborne distribution of a harmful sub-
stance in a confined area or contamination of food or water supply 124
The requirement of a single human defendant not only preserves doc-
trinal symmetry but also guards against inordinate expansion of the
lawsuit and the spectre of undeserving plaintiffs recovering from de-
fendants who were not personally responsible for their injuries. These
requirements would thus tend to assure that Paradigm I suits would be
manageable both in number and in size.'
2 5
Sindell, however, permitted a suit against a class of multiple de-
fendants. This raises a final objection-that extending tort compensa-
tion to indeterminate plaintiffs would inexorably combine with existing
theory to permit causes of action against indeterminate defendants.
The ultimate result might be open-ended liability, with damages ex-
ceeding anything the legal system has hitherto known.
D Combining Both Theories: Indeterminate Plaintifs Versus
Indeterminate Defendants
If causation rules are relaxed for indeterminate plaintiffs, the so-
bering possibility exists that ingenious counsel will combine both the
Sindell doctrine and its inverse in a suit by a class of indeterminate
plaintiffs against a class of indeterminate defendants. Imagine, for ex-
ample, several manufacturers which, acting independently, market an
identical substance known to cause a certain type of injury. The injury
also occurs naturally, so that its occurrence does not in itself implicate
any of the manufacturers. A substantial rise in the incidence of the
injury immediately follows. Investigation eliminates other possible
causes of the increase.
122. But see infra Part IV, Section D ("Combining Both Theories: Indeterminate Plaintiff
Versus Indeterminate Defendants").
123. This is so because epidemiological inferences about causation are most easily drawn in
such situations. E.g., B. McMAHoN & T. PUGH, supra note 19, at 207-83; J. MAUSNER & A.
BAHN, spra note 19, at 63-110, 307-30.
124. E.g., J. MAUSER & A. BAlm, supra note 19, at 296-99.
125. Sindell-type suits will be rare because they require causal indeterminacy and a group bf
defendants who behaved identically-a situation not likely to arise with great frequency. Re-
verse-Sindell suits require causal indeterminacy and a group of plaintiffs who suffered injury in a
uniform manner. These, too, should be relatively rare.
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Neither the Sindell nor the reverse-Sindell doctrine will apply. 12 6
But there seems to exist no theoretical reason not to permit a plaintiff to
unite both principles and thus launch a massive lawsuit presenting
complex problems of proof and requiring a large investment of judicial
resources. The distribution of any damage award would be an ac-
countant's nightmare, requiring proration with respect to both the de-
fendant and plaintiff classes. Because of the high costs and special
dangers of such suits,127 courts may well refuse to hear them at least
until there has been an adequate period of experimentation with both
types of Sindell causation rules.
CONCLUSION
The development of special cause-in-fact rules to aid plaintiffs
confronted with indeterminacy in the defendant class suggests that a
similar modification might occur when indeterminacy lies in the plain-
tiff class. Although current law does not permit recovery when the de-
fendant is identifiable but the specific plaintiffs are not, many of the
same considerations that supported recovery in Summers v. Tice and in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories support it here. Permitting indetermi-
nate plaintiffs to sue for their injuries promotes tort goals of compensa-
tion, deterrence, efficiency, knowledge generation, and justice.
Distribution of damages can be accomplished by a variety of allocation
schemes, employing a form of proportional recovery. This extension is
maintainable in the face of objections that it would compensate persons
who do not deserve it, would award damages based on probabilistic
evidence, and would be available either too rarely or too often. It
would eliminate an existing asymmetry in causal doctrine, and would
advance the policy objectives of the substantive areas in which it is
likely to be applied.
Modified tort rules for indeterminate plaintiffs are thus a logical
and desirable next step in the development of tort doctrine.
126. The Sindell approach requires a plaintiff known to have been injured by human
tortfeasors; the reverse-Sindell approach requires a single human defendant known to have caused
a determinable number of injuries. Therefore, neither doctrine fits this hypothetical situation.
127. These costs include the commitment of possibly massive judicial resources to the trying
of the suit, the risk of "strike" suits ified for their settlement or harrassment value, and the risk
that juries will simply prove unable to deal with the technical complexities of such cases. All such
problems are present, of course, in the Sindell and reverse-Sindell situations, standing alone. The
combined effect of uniting both indeterminate plaintiffs and defendants may exceed the legal sys-
tem's ability to adapt. Cf. Shavell, supra note 90, at 494 (causation rules exist, in part, to keep
litigation costs within reasonable bounds).
